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11 Introduction
Tournaments are highly competitive situations, where agents compete for
prizes as for instance employees for a promotion. Such situations of tour-
nament competition have been analyzed analytically within many diﬀerent
frameworks since the seminal article of Lazear and Rosen (1981).1 Ak e y
aspect of the literature is that tournaments seem to be an eﬀective incentive
instrument in many situations. First of all, only ordinal information on the
agent’s performance is needed and even if performance signals are unveriﬁ-
able to third parties, a tournament can induce incentives as the principal can
credibly commit to pay out winner and loser prizes. Furthermore, tourna-
ment results are unaﬀe c t e db yc o m m o ns h o c k st h a ta ﬀect the performance
of all participants.
However, it is important to note that tournaments necessarily create a
high degree of income inequality even among initially identical agents. When
agents are purely motivated by material self-interest, this does not pose a
problem as the agents’ well being and their incentives to exert eﬀort is not
aﬀected by the ex-post inequality in payoﬀs. But many experiments indicate
that a considerable number of individuals is not purely motivated by material
self-interest, but cares about the well being of others. Loewenstein et al.
(1989) for instance ﬁnd strong evidence that people dislike inequitable payoﬀ
distributions and this has been conﬁrmed in numerous other studies.2 As
a general observation it can be stated, that a person’s utility at a given
individual income is lower, when other individuals either have higher or lower
payoﬀs than the person itself. On the basis of experimental ﬁndings, Fehr
1Compare e.g. Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), O’Keefe et al. (1984), Bhattacharya and
Guasch (1988) or Lazear (1989).
2Compare for instance Fehr and Schmidt (2002) for an overview.
2and Schmidt (1999) have developed a simple utility function to encompass
inequity aversion as a form of social preferences.3 They show that many
experimental ﬁndings that are puzzling when being analyzed with standard
self-centered utility can be explained when inequity aversion is taken into
account.
But if agents indeed do have such social preferences, the eﬀectiveness
of a tournament as an incentive instrument will be aﬀected. On the one
hand, the losers of a tournament may feel disadvantageous inequity, which
can be characterized as envy in addition to having a lower material payoﬀ
than the winners.4 On the other hand, the winners enjoy the higher winner
prize (for instance the promotion encompassing a wage increase) but may
dislike advantageous inequity to some extent, which can be characterized as
compassion. Note that it is not clear at the outset whether the motivation
of an inequity averse agent in a tournament is higher or lower than that of
a purely self-regarding agent. If an agent anticipates that he will sense envy
when losing the tournament, this may rise his incentives to exert eﬀort to
prevent such a situation. But in contrast, the anticipation of compassion may
lower the incentives, as winning the tournament becomes less attractive.
It is therefore necessary to study the eﬀects of envy and compassion in a
tournament formally. Applying the utility function developed by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), we analyze a very simple tournament model with two homo-
geneous agents. Inequity is speciﬁed as inequality in the approach of Fehr and
Schmidt, which is suitable in a tournament situation, where the participants
are situated in a symmetric decision environment. The utility function al-
3A similar approach has been taken by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). See also Charness
and Rabin (2002) for a recent detailed discussion of alternative utility representations of
social preferences.
4For a diﬀerent economic approach for the incorporation of envy compare Mui (1995).
3lows to separate very nicely the eﬀects of advantageous and disadvantageous
inequity aversion.
First, the outcome of a tournament among inequity averse agents is inves-
tigated for a given prize structure. Second, we investigate the optimal design
of the tournament if the principal takes the inequity aversion of the agents
into account. It turns out that for a given prize structure the equilibrium
eﬀort choice is increasing with the importance of envy and decreasing with
that of compassion. If envy is a stronger feeling than compassion, which is
typically conﬁrmed by experimental studies, this leads to a positive overall
eﬀect of inequity aversion on equilibrium eﬀort.
But this result is reversed if the agents’ participation constraint is taken
into account and the optimal tournament design is analyzed. On the one
hand, the incentive eﬀect caused by inequity aversion continues to be of
importance. But on the other hand, the agents’ inequity aversion leads to
”inequity cost” that reduce their utility from taking part in the tournament.
It turns out that only the participation eﬀect matters for total welfare as
the incentive eﬀect is always neutralized by adapting the prize structure
appropriately. Therefore, in contrast to a standard tournament model with
risk neutral agents the optimal prize structure fails to implement ﬁrst-best
eﬀorts when agents are inequity averse. It directly results that tournaments
among agents with purely self-regarding preferences lead to a higher eﬃciency
than tournaments among inequity averse agents.
There is one important point that has been neglected in the recent the-
oretical literature on inequity aversion, namely the question of the relevant
reference group included in an agent’s social preferences. As Loewenstein
et al. (1989) point out, the extent of inequity aversion is aﬀected by the so-
cial context. Therefore, it seems to be important to take this into account
4when analyzing the impact of social preferences on tournament outcomes in
speciﬁc applications. In this paper, we consider the speciﬁc situation of a
promotion tournament where agents compete for a job on a higher hierar-
chical level. A typical decision ﬁrms have to take in practice is whether the
successor of some hierarchical superior should be chosen among the subor-
dinates of this superior (vertical promotion) or from a diﬀerent department
(lateral promotion). We assume that inequity aversion is felt stronger if an
individual compares his own well being with that of a close colleague than
with someone less well known from a diﬀerent branch of the organization as
there is less social distance among direct colleagues. Then the described per-
sonnel policy choice should have an impact on the agents’ utility and in turn
on their incentives to exert eﬀort in the promotion tournament. Therefore,
we examine this application in closer detail in Subsection 5.4.
Only little work has been done so far that makes use of relative utility
components in tournaments. Exceptions are the informal discussion by Stark
(1990) and the model by Kräkel (2000) who introduces relative deprivation
in tournaments. In those papers, individuals’ behavior is only guided by
the avoidance of relative deprivation which is related to disadvantageous
inequity aversion but neither care for their direct material payoﬀ nor consider
the eﬀects of advantageous inequity. Recent papers that have examined
moral hazard problems with a single agent in view of inequity aversion are
Englmaier and Wambach (2002) and Fehr et al. (2002).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
our simple tournament model encompassing inequity averse preferences. The
equilibrium eﬀort choices for a tournament with a given prize structure are
derived in Section 3. Afterwards, Section 4 deals with the optimal tourna-
ment prize structure, when the principal takes the participation constraint
5of the agents into account. For each case, the consequences of inequity aver-
sion for the principal’s proﬁt are discussed. In Section 5 we analyze some
extensions of the model. Spitefulness is discussed as an extreme case of an
agent’s preferences with interesting implications. Sabotage is introduced as
a second possibility for the agents to improve their probability to win the
tournament. Brieﬂy we discuss the case of agents who are asymmetric with
respect to their preferences for envy or compassion. Finally, the model is ap-
plied to the strategic decision of ﬁrms concerning their corporate promotion
policy. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We analyze a simple tournament model in which two agents i = A,B com-
pete for a prize which may for instance represent a promotion to a higher
hierarchical level. Each of the two agents produces an individual output
which accrues to the principal. Agent i’s output is given by
qi = h(ei)+εi,
where ei is the eﬀort exerted by agent i, h(ei) a concave function and εi a
random component. The random components of both agents are independent
and identically distributed. The cost of individual eﬀort are C (ei) with
C0 (ei) > 0 and C00 (ei) > 0. The winner of the tournament is the agent who
has produced the highest qi. He gets the winner prize w1 (for instance the
wage on a higher level of the corporate hierarchy after a promotion) and the
loser gets w2 with w2 <w 1. For ease of notation we deﬁne the prize spread
∆w = w1 − w2.
As we discussed in the introduction we assume that the agents are in-
equity averse concerning the wage payments. To model this, we make use
6of the utility function developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Agent i’s
(i ∈ {A,B}) utility is given by
ui = wi − αmax{wj − wi;0} − β max{wi − wj;0} − C (ei), (1)
where wi and wj are the wages of the agents.5 The agent’s total utility is
therefore the sum of his monetary income wi less some “inequity costs” and
his costs of eﬀort. On the one hand, the agents feel envy, i.e. they dislike
disadvantageous inequality: If the agent earns one unit of money less than
his colleague, his utility is reduced by α ≥ 0 units. On the other hand,
the agents feel some form of compassion, i.e. they also dislike advantageous
inequality to some extent characterized by the value of β ≥ 0. Following Fehr
and Schmidt as well as the empirical study by Loewenstein et al. (1989) we
assume that the dislike of disadvantageous inequality is stronger than that of
advantageous inequality, i.e. α > β. Furthermore, we assume that β ≤ 1,i . e .
a na g e n ti sa l w a y sb e t t e ro ﬀ if he receives more money and his colleague’s
income is held constant.
We can now easily compute the utility of the winner of the tournament.
If agent i is the winner, his utility is given by
u
W
i = w1 − β∆w − C (ei)=w2 +( 1− β)∆w − C (ei). (2)
Hence, the utility gain from receiving the prize spread ∆w in addition
to the lower prize w2 is reduced by the “costs of compassion” β∆w. The
corresponding utility if he loses is
u
L
i = w2 − α∆w − C (ei). (3)
5Note that we assume that the agents’ preferences are not aﬀected by the principal’s
income, as she does not belong to their reference group. Neither we assume that the
principal has social preferences.
7The loser not only earns the lower prize w2, but in addition he suﬀers from
the “costs of envy” characterized by α∆w.
3 Incentives and Inequity Aversion
In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the agents’ incentives in the tournament for a given
prize structure (w1,w 2).A g e n ti’s probability of winning the tournament is
Pr(qi >q j)=P r {εi − εj >h(ej) − h(ei)}.
Let G() be the distribution function of the random variable εi − εj and g()
its density. Hence, i’s winning probability is simply 1 −G(h(ej) − h(ei)) =
G(h(ei) − h(ej)) and his expected utility in this situation is
EUi(ei)=G(h(ei) − h(ej))[w1 − β∆w − C (ei)]
+(1− G(h(ei) − h(ej)))[w2 − α∆w − C (ei)]
= w2 − α∆w + G(h(ei) − h(ej))[∆w(1 − β + α)] − C(ei) (4)
We now seek a Nash equilibrium of the eﬀo r tc h o i c eg a m ea m o n gb o t ha g e n t s .
Both are maximizing their expected utility with respect to ei.T h eﬁrst order
conditions are necessary for an equilibrium in pure strategies6 and yield
g(h(ei) − h(ej))h
0 (ei)[∆w(1 − β + α)] − C
0(ei)=0 ,
g(h(ej) − h(ei))h
0 (ej)[∆w(1 − β + α)] − C
0(ej)=0 .
Note that g(x)=g(−x) as the εi are identically distributed. As in a standard
tournament this directly implies that the equilibrium must be symmetric.7
6The existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium in tournament models is typically not
automatically assured. See the discussion in Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, fn. 2, or
Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983). Existence can be assured if C (e) is “suﬃciently convex”, i.e.
mine C00 (ei) is suﬃciently large such that the objective functions are concave.
7Note that
C0(e)
h0(e) is a monotonically increasing function of e.
8As usual, in tournament models the existence of such an equilibrium is en-
sured if the cost function is suﬃciently convex.8 We can thus characterize
equilibrium eﬀort:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, both agents choose identical eﬀort levels e1 =
e2 = e∗ characterized by




The equilibrium eﬀort is increasing in the strength of envy α and decreasing
in that of compassion β. A tournament among inequity averse agents leads to
higher eﬀorts than one among agents with purely self-regarding preferences.
As the right-hand side of (5) is increasing in e the equilibrium eﬀort is
increasing in α and decreasing in β. Note that only the loser but not the
winner of the tournament suﬀers from envy. The existence of envy thus
enlarges the utility gap between the winner and the loser. But this of course
induces higher incentives for the agents ex-ante to exert eﬀort and thereby
to raise the probability of winning the tournament. On the other hand, only
the winner senses compassion. But a compassionate agent enjoys winning
the tournament less and therefore compassion reduces incentives.
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem intuitive that inequity averse agents should
exert lower eﬀort levels in a highly competitive situation as a tournament
with very uneven outcomes. But the opposite is true. As for instance has
been found by Loewenstein et al. (1989), disadvantageous inequality aﬀects
utility to a stronger extent than advantageous inequality. In the terms of
our utility function we therefore assumed α > β. Hence, the eﬀect of envy
8Compare Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, or Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988), p.
871.
9on incentives outweighs that of compassion. Our model therefore predicts
larger equilibrium eﬀorts when agents are inequity averse than with merely
self-interested agents.
I ti sn o wo fc o u r s eo fi m p o r t a n c et oa n a l y z et h ei m p a c to fi n e q u i t ya v e r -
sion on optimal tournament design. In particular, it is interesting to see
whether a principal organizing a tournament beneﬁts from inequity aversion
or whether she will be better oﬀ with purely self-interested agents.
It is instructive to consider a situation in which the prizes are ﬁxed and
given in advance and the agent’s participation is guaranteed for instance
because the wages are suﬃciently high for exogenous reasons. In that case,
we obtain the following straightforward corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 If the prize structure is ﬁxed, the principal’s proﬁt is the higher
the more envious the agents are and the lower the more they feel compassion.
A tournament among inequity averse agents leads to higher proﬁts than one
among agents with purely self-regarding preferences.
As the principal’s payoﬀ is strictly increasing in the agents’ eﬀort and
the prizes are given, she is better oﬀ when the agents exert more eﬀort for a
given prize structure.
4 The Optimal Tournament Prize Structure
So far the agents’ decision to participate in the tournament has not been
taken into account. If the principal can freely adapt the prize structure, this
will of course be of importance. We assume that both agents’ reservation
utilities are given by U0.
We will proceed by analyzing the optimal prize structure of a tournament
10with inequity averse agents and will again compare the results with those of
a standard tournament with purely self-interested agents.
The principal’s expected payoﬀ is given by
2h(e
∗) − 2w2 − ∆w (6)
where e∗ is the equilibrium eﬀort which according to (5) depends on the prize
spread ∆w. N o w ,s h eh a st ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h a ta na g e n ti’s expected




(1 − β − α)∆w − C (e
∗) ≥ U0. (7)
Note that the agents’ expected utility when participating is lowered by envy
and compassion: Envy reduces the attractiveness as an agent suﬀers to a
larger extent from losing the tournament. But compassion does the same as
winning the tournament is less attractive if the loser’s payoﬀ has an impact
on the winner’s utility. It is most plausible that α + β < 1, as otherwise
increasing the winner prize without aﬀecting the loser prize may make an
agent worse oﬀ. Only for exceptional cases it might be possible that the
disutility due to uneven outcomes outweighs the utility of a higher winner
prize (α + β > 1). We assume that U0 is suﬃciently small such that the
principal will indeed always have an interest to hire both agents.
The principal maximizes her surplus given by (6) by taking into account
the incentive condition (5) and the participation constraint (7). In equilib-
rium, the participation constraint will be binding. Otherwise the principal
would be able to lower w2 without aﬀecting the incentive constraint. Hence,
we can solve the binding constraint (7) for w2 and obtain
w2 = U0 −
1
2
(1 − β − α)∆w + C (ei).
11By substituting the result in the principal’s objective function and rearrang-

















where e∗ (∆w) is the equilibrium eﬀort for a given prize spread ∆w as deﬁned
by (5). The principal thus maximizes the total surplus from production
2(h(e) − C (e)) reduced by (α + β)∆w and the agents’ opportunity costs
2U0. The latter term will be called the inequity costs of the tournament.
It is instructive to brieﬂy consider the ﬁrst-best solution obtained in the
reference case where eﬀorts are directly contractible. The principal would
simply impose the eﬀort levels maximizing the surplus from production. In
that case no inequity costs arise. She would pay equal ﬁxed wages to the
agents that cover their costs of eﬀort and meet the participation constraints.
At the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels the marginal costs of eﬀort are therefore equal










As we have seen, however, the implementation of a tournament automatically
leads to an unequal treatment of both agents ex-post which encompasses in
itself a utility loss that has to be taken into account when the tournament is
designed. By solving (8) we analyze the impact of this utility loss:
Proposition 2 When agents are inequity averse the principal will implement


























These eﬀorts are smaller than the eﬃcient eﬀort levels.
12Proof:
This can be seen in the simplest way by using e instead of ∆w as the decision
variable. Let ∆w(e)=e∗−1 (e) be the prize spread that implements a given
eﬀort level e in the tournament. From (5) we must therefore have that
∆w(e)=
C0(e)
h0(e)(1−β+α)g(0). We can reformulate (8) and obtain
max
e 2h(e) − 2C (e) − 2U0 − (α + β)
C0 (e)
h0 (e)(1+α − β)g(0)
The ﬁrst order condition directly yields (10). The second term of the left-
hand side is strictly positive if α or β > 0 as C00(e)h0 (e) > 0 and C0 (e)h00(e) <
0 for any value of e.
If agents have purely self-regarding preferences (i.e. α = β =0 )( 1 0 )a n d
(9) coincide. The principal will implement the ﬁrst-best eﬀort. This is a
standard result for symmetric tournaments (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)).
However, as Proposition 2 shows, this result no longer holds when agents
are inequity averse: By comparing (10) with (9) it can be directly seen that
the second-best eﬀort levels implemented in the tournament are smaller than
the ﬁrst-best levels as the second term on the left-hand side of (10) is strictly
positive if α or β are positive. This is due to the inequity costs that arise in
a tournament. As we have seen, implementing a high eﬀort in a tournament
necessarily comes along with an unequal treatment of both agents. The
larger the prize spread, the higher is the eﬀort level but also the greater is
the inequality imposed. The principal has to compensate the agents for the
utility loss triggered by the inequality. The higher ∆w the larger must be
this compensation. Due to that eﬀe c ti ti st o oc o s t l yf o rt h ep r i n c i p a lt o
implement the ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
13A direct corollary of this result is:
Corollary 2 When the principal can design the optimal tournament struc-
ture, a tournament among agents with purely self-regarding preferences leads
to higher proﬁts than one among inequity averse agents.
Proof:
With self-interested agents the principal will implement the ﬁrst-best eﬀorts.
Hence, the surplus from production is maximized. With inequity aversion
the surplus from production is lower and, in addition — although the agents
get their reservation utility in both cases —, the sum of the wage payments
to them is higher as they have to be compensated for the inequity. As can
be seen from (8) his proﬁt must therefore be smaller.
It is interesting to compare this result to that of Corollary 1 where we
have shown that the principal is better oﬀ with competing inequity averse
agents when the prize structure is given. In that case, the principal’s interest
lies in maximizing eﬀorts for a given prize spread. As we have seen, inequity
averse agents exert higher eﬀorts in a given tournament than self-interested
agents. Hence, there is an incentive eﬀect of inequity aversion which seems
to work in favour of the principal. Now, we also took into account the eﬀect
of inequity aversion on the attractiveness of taking part in a tournament. As
we have shown, inequity averse agents dislike the inherent inequality of the
tournament and have to be compensated for this. This participation eﬀect
works into the opposite direction and makes the principal worse oﬀ when
agents are inequity averse.
To understand why the latter is dominant it is important to note that
the incentive eﬀect vanishes entirely when the prize structure can be freely
14adapted. The principal can always set a ∆w of arbitrary size and implement
any eﬀort level she likes as she can always adapt the loser prize w2 such that
she never leaves any rent to the agents. But the inequity costs remain in any
tournament.
5 Extensions
Based on our general model we can derive additional results with extensions
of the framework. In particular, we focus on four simple extensions: First, we
consider the extreme case of agents with preferences representing spitefulness,
second, we introduce the possibility of sabotage as a diﬀerent way for the
agents to inﬂuence the tournament outcome. Third, we look at agents who
are heterogeneous in terms of varying inequity attitudes and fourth, we apply
our model to a ﬁrm’s decision on its promotion policy.
5.1 Spitefulness
In our analysis we have assumed so far that agents sense compassion, when
they are better oﬀ than their respective colleagues, which has been repre-
sented by assuming positive values of β. But as pointed out by Loewenstein
et al. (1989) for instance, in some situations the opposite form of social pref-
erences can be observed: spitefulness. An agent is spiteful, if he derives
pleasure from being better oﬀ than his colleague which can easily be intro-
duced in the model by simply assuming that β < 0.
By inspecting Equation (5) in Proposition 1 it can be directly seen that
spiteful agents exert even higher eﬀorts for a given prize structure. Like
before, they suﬀer from envy when losing the tournament, which reduces the
utility in case of being second. But those agents also receive the additional
15pleasure of being better oﬀ than the loser when winning the tournament
which increases the utility in case of being ﬁrst. Hence, the utility spread
generated by the prize spread ∆w is higher when agents are spiteful, which in
turn generates additional incentives. For a given prize structure the principal
is therefore better oﬀ when spiteful agents compete in a tournament.
But it is interesting to consider also the participation eﬀect in view of
the spitefulness of agents. As long as α > |β| the result of Proposition 2
continues to hold that the principal implements less than ﬁrst-best eﬀort
with a tournament when the agents are inequity averse. If α = |β| then the
ﬁrst-best eﬀort is attained as can be seen form equation (10). However, when
spitefulness is stronger than envy, i.e. α < |β|, it can be directly seen that
the principal will implement even more eﬀo r tt h a ni nt h eﬁrst-best solution
in that case. The reason for this result is that the ’joy’ of being better
oﬀ than the opponent for the winner outweighs the costs of envy borne by
the loser. The principal can use this and reduce his overall payment to the
agents by increasing the prize spread even though this leads to ineﬃciently
high eﬀort levels. She will do this only to some extent as eﬀort costs are
convex and the gain from exploiting the agents’ extreme spitefulness is only
linearly increasing.
5.2 Sabotage
It has been stressed by Lazear (1989) that one drawback of tournaments is
that agents may have an incentive to increase their own chances of winning
by sabotaging their opponents. We now brieﬂy consider the eﬀect of inequity
aversion on the agents’ incentives to exert such counterproductive eﬀort.
Both agents now have a second possibility to improve their winning prob-
abilities in the tournament next to the eﬀort choice ei.S i m i l a rt oL a z e a rw e
16assume that agent i can choose a sabotage eﬀort si against his opponent
in order to reduce the opponent’s output. Hence, an agent i’s output qi is
inﬂuenced by his own eﬀort level ei, the amount of sabotage of his opponent
sj and again by the random component εi:
qi = he(ei) − hs(sj)+εi,
where ∂hs/∂s>0 and ∂2hs/∂s2 < 0.A g e n t i’s eﬀo r tc o s tn o wd e p e n do n
the choice of ei and si a n di sa s s u m e dt ob ec o n v e xi nb o t ht e r m sCe(ei)
and Cs(si). Thus, the utility of the winner (uW
i ) and the loser (uL




i = w1 − β∆w − Ce(ei) − Cs(si)
u
L
i = w2 − α∆w − Ce(ei) − Cs(si).
As before, we can compute the expected utility of agent i:
EUi = w2 − α∆w + G(he(ei) − hs(sj) − he(ej)+hs(si))[∆w(1 − β + α)]
− Ce(ei) − Cs(si) (11)
We can again compute the ﬁrst order conditions and obtain that in a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium both agents choose identical eﬀort levels e1 =
e2 = e∗ and now also identical levels of sabotage s1 = s2 = s∗,w h i c ha r e
determined by:












The ﬁrst condition (12) corresponds to condition (5) in Proposition 1 before.
As it is already known from Lazear (1989) increasing the wage spread in-
creases the productive as well as the counterproductive eﬀort. Furthermore,
17the equilibrium level of sabotage is increasing in the strength of envy and
decreasing in that of compassion. Therefore, if sabotage is possible for a
ﬁxed prize structure not only the productive eﬀort of inequity averse agents
but also the counterproductive sabotage eﬀort is higher compared to the
case of purely self interested agents. This result is in line with experimental
evidence by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2002). They ﬁnd that the average ef-
fort and sobatage choice exceeds the equilibrium level predicted by standard
tournament theory with purely self interested agents.
Analogously to the case of self interested agents analyzed in Lazear (1989)
the optimal prize spread will be smaller, when the possibility of sabotage
exists. But in consequence of a decreasing prize spread, the agents lower
their productive eﬀort as well.
5.3 Asymmetric Agents
Until now we have assumed that the agents are homogeneous with regard to
their feelings of envy and compassion. It may, however, seem to be interesting
to derive the equilibrium eﬀort levels in the case of asymmetric agents. We
now concentrate on asymmetric agents with respect to the strength of envious
and compassionate preferences.9 Hence, we now allow for diﬀerent values of
α and β between the agents. Again the agents are maximizing their expected
utility with respect to e:
max
ei
w2 − αi∆w + G(h(ei) − h(ej))[∆w(1 − βi + αi)] − C(ei)
max
ej
w2 − αj∆w + G(h(ej) − h(ei))
£
∆w(1 − βj + αj)
¤
− C(ej)
9See O’Keefe et al. (1984) for the analysis of asymmetric agents in tournaments with
regard to their ability. One of their important results, namely that the agent with the
higher ability chooses a higher eﬀort level, can easily be replicated with our approach by
introducing diﬀerent functions of h(e).
18The ﬁrst order conditions yield
g(h(ei) − h(ej))h






















(1 − βi + αi)
We will therefore typically have asymmetric equilibria when the agents diﬀer
in the extent of inequity aversion. For identical levels of β t h em o r ee n v i o u s
agent (the agent with the higher level of α) will choose the higher eﬀort
level since C0 (e)/h0 (e) is increasing in e. On the other hand, the more
compassionate agent (with the higher level of β) will choose the lower eﬀort
level for an equal value of α. Hence, just like in the result of our initial
model with homogeneous agents, eﬀort is increasing in the level of envy and
decreasing in the level of compassion as the marginal beneﬁts of the agents
rise (decrease) with increasing envy (compassion).
5.4 Vertical versus Lateral Promotions
The former considerations are now applied to a speciﬁc question of personnel
policy. The management of a ﬁrm has to decide about the general pro-
motion policy. In principle, there are two extreme possibilities to organize
promotions within a corporate hierarchy.10 First, there might be only vertical
promotions in the sense that the promoted agent becomes the superior of the
group (department, branch,...) he formerly worked in. Second, lateral pro-
motions m a yt a k ep l a c ei nt h ef o r mt h a tap r o m o t e de m p l o y e eg e t sap o s i t i o n
10We abstract from the option of external recruitments. See Chan (1996) for the analysis
of this question.
19in a diﬀerent part of the ﬁrm or may become the superior of a neighboring
group. For simplicity we think of a ﬁrm with two groups A (with the agents
i and j)a n dB (with the agents k and l), where the agents in each group
compete for a promotion to a managing position (see Figure 1). The idea is
that only the ordinal rank of an agent within his group is observable and,
hence, only one agent from each group can be promoted.11
A key assumption we make is that envy and compassion are stronger when
promotions are vertical. In this case the winner of the promotion tournament
becomes the superior of the corresponding loser which is his former colleague
a n db o t ha r ef a c e dw i t ht h er e s u l to ft h et o u r n a m e n tp e r m a n e n t l y . I nt h e
case of lateral promotions the winner is separated from the loser subsequent
t ot h et o u r n a m e n t( i . e . t h ew i n n e ro ft h et o u r n a m e n to fg r o u pA becomes
the manager of group B). Hence, the winner will sense less compassion and
the loser will feel less envious than in the vertical promotion case. Neither
winner nor loser do face their former colleagues any more. For simplicity and
analytical clarity we assume that envy and compassion do not matter at all
in the case of lateral promotions.12
What kind of promotion policy should the management choose? In order
to approach this question we apply our simple model from Section 2 to the
quoted problem. Let τ be the probability of a vertical promotion in a ﬁrm so
that with probability 1−τ winners of promotion tournaments are promoted
11Note that this of couse has some drawbacks. Since tournaments often extend over
a longer time period, intermediate information may weaken incentives if agents compete
within one department (see McLaughlin (1988), p. 249 or Prendergast and Topel (1993)
, p. 362). This may not be the case if agents compete across departments.
















Figure 1: Vertical and Lateral Promotions
laterally. Envy and compassion do only matter in vertical promotions. This
lead to the expected utility of agent i of
EUi(ei)=w2 − τα∆w + G(h(ei) − h(ej))[∆w(1 − τβ+ τα)] − C(ei)
Analogously to (5) the optimal eﬀort choices of the agents can be computed
by maximizing this expression. They are determined by:




Since α > β, e∗ is increasing in τ.H e n c e ,e ﬀort is maximized with τ =1 .
For a given prize structure vertical promotions should be preferred to the
lateral promotion policy. As in Proposition 1 the (positive) eﬀect of envy
outweighs the (negative) eﬀect of compassion. The eﬀo r ti sh i g h e ra st h e
agents work harder to prevent the situation of becoming the subordinate of
a former direct colleague.
Analogously, it is very easy to see that the implementation of lateral pro-
motions become favorable, when the principal takes the participation con-
straint into account and therefore the eﬀect of the promotion policy on the
agents’s utility of working in the ﬁrm. In this case, inequity costs can be
economized, which lead to higher proﬁts for the principal. As people dislike
21being either a subordinate or a superior of a former colleague, the princi-
pal can raise the utility (i.e., the job satisfaction) of his employees when
committing to a lateral promotion policy.
This result holds without further restrictions as long as there are no large
diﬀerences in the required human capital for the managing positions A and B.
B u ti tm i g h tbepo s s i b l et h a tt h ea g e n t so fg r o u pA acquire some knowledge or
ability by on-the-job training, which is important especially for the managing
position A. This group-speciﬁc human capital cannot be accumulated by the
agents in group B, who are the candidates for the managing position A,i ft h e
principal insists on lateral promotions. If the costs of necessary additional
training in the case of lateral promotions outweigh the economized inequity
costs, vertical promotions may still be the best policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed the eﬀects of inequity aversion on incentives
in tournaments. We deﬁned negative inequity aversion as envy and positive
inequity aversion as compassion. It has been shown that inequity averse
agents exert higher eﬀort levels than purely self-interested agents for a given
prize structure but that ﬁrst-best eﬀorts are no longer implemented when
prizes are endogenous. In that case, tournaments inherently create inequity
costs as they create an outcome with asymmetric payoﬀse v e ni fi n i t i a l l y
agents are identical.
Several applications have been studied. First of all, if agents are spiteful,
deﬁned as negative compassion, then it might be optimal for the principal
to choose prize spreads that lead to eﬀort levels which are larger than ﬁrst-
best eﬀorts in the extreme case where spitefulness exceeds envy. Second, the
22eﬀect of social preferences on the incentives to sabotage colleagues has been
brieﬂy investigated: Whereas envious agents tend to exert higher levels of
counterproductive eﬀort compassion reduces the danger of sabotage.
Finally, the question has been studied whether ﬁrms should choose lateral
or vertical promotion policies. It has been pointed out that vertical promo-
tions lead to higher eﬀorts with a given wage structure. But lateral pro-
motions might be beneﬁcial when the agents’ participation decision is taken
into account as they economize on “inequity costs”. These costs arise when
former colleagues from the same department ﬁnd themselves in a situation
of one being the superior of the other.
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